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When is Parenthood Dissoluble? 
Patrick Parkinson* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Across the western world, there has been a major shift in the law 
concerning parenting after separation in the last thirty years. The notion 
that following the breakdown of a marriage, the court simply allocated 
the children to one parent or the other has given way to an emphasis on 
the importance of having both parents involved in children's lives 
following separation. This typically involves joint parental responsibility 
even if the parents never married, and, where geographical proximity 
allows, some level of shared parenting. Whereas once family law was 
premised on the indissolubility of marriage, now a defining feature of 
family law in Western societies is the notion that parenthood is 
indissoluble. 
Women's groups and feminist scholars have long resisted this 
transformation in family law, and one of the arguments used in recent 
years is that laws that promote the indissolubility of parenthood place 
women and children at risk from violence and abuse. 
This article proceeds first by reviewing trends in the Western world 
concerning the transformation of post-separation family life, and then 
considers how the issue of domestic violence can and should be dealt 
with in the context of an acceptance that for the most part the 'family' 
continues after parental separation. 
The article explores different legislative models for how the issue of 
domestic violence should be dealt with in an era of indissoluble 
parenthood, using illustrations from the laws of Australia, California, 
Massachusetts, New York, New Zealand, Oregon and Wisconsin as 
examples of different approaches. Its premise is that an absolute priority 
must be given to the safety of women and children from a risk of serious 
harm and this means that parenthood must be dissoluble in some 
instances. However, many laws cast the net too wide by focusing on a 
history of violence rather than current safety concerns. The argument of 
the article is that there are not two irreconcilable choices-greater 
involvement of non-resident fathers on the one hand and protection from 
domestic violence on the other. There is also a need to differentiate 
between types of family violence in assessing the risk of violence or 
abuse in the future. 
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II. THE INDISSOLUBILITY OF PARENTHOOD 
In the last thirty years, profound changes have occurred in family 
law all around the western world. The model on which divorce reform 
was predicated in the late 1960s and early 1970s has irretrievably broken 
down. Jurisdictions across the western world have come to the 
sometimes painful conclusion that while marriage may be dissoluble, 
parenthood is not. Children generally benefit from the involvement of 
both parents in their lives, and that means the parental relationship must 
often continue after separation. That has significant implications for legal 
processes, rules and principles. 1 
Yet there arc situations where parenthood needs to be dissolved, in 
particular where there are serious concerns about the safety of women 
and children. This Article explores when sole parenthood after separation 
is, or ought to be, the best option. However, the policy issues cannot 
properly be understood without setting the context of the transformation 
that has occurred in the legal regulation of the post-separation family all 
over the western world. 
A. Divorce as the Dissolution of the Family 
The model on which divorce reform was predicated in the late 1960s 
and early 1970s was built upon a consensus that dead marriages should 
be given a decent burial and that it should be possible for the parties to 
get on with their lives and start afresh once decisions had been made 
about financial matters and custody? In the divorce law at that time, 
issues about property and custody were dealt with by a once-for-all 
process of allocation. 3 If the parties could not reach their own agreement, 
then the court allocated the property. The aim in some jurisdictions was 
to achieve a clean break in terms of the financial affairs of the parties, 
apart from child support.4 The court also allocated the children.5 
Typically, the courts would award "custody" to one parent, usually the 
mother, and grant "access" or "visitation" to the other. 6 There was little 
difference in this respect between common law countries and the civil 
* Professor of Law, University of Sydney, Australia; President, International Society of Family Law. 
1. These international trends are reviewed in PATRICK PARKINSON, FAMILY LAW AND TilE 
INDISSOLUBILITY OF PARENTHOOD (2011 ). This Article draws heavily upon material published in 
that book, especially ch. 6. 
2. !d. at21. 
3. !d. at 22. 
4. The clean break philosophy in financial matters was explicit in the 1975 reforms in 
Australia. See Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 81 (Austl.). 
5. ANDREW I. SC:HEPARD, CHILDREN, COURTS AND CUSTODY 3 4 (2004 ). 
6. PARKINSON,supranotc l,at22. 
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law countries of Western Europe. 7 "Custody" included virtually all the 
rights and powers that an adult needed to bring up a child, including the 
right to make decisions about a child's education and religion.R Both 
parents were legal guardians at common law, but this meant little, 
because the powers which were classified as powers of "guardianship" 
were few and far betwccn.9 They included such matters as consent to 
marriage, consent to issuance of a passport, and inheritance rights on the 
death ofthe minor. Since maternal custody was the predominant pattern, 
fathers were frequently relegated to a peripheral role in their children's 
lives. 
Custody law was thus binary in charactcr. 1 0 The assumption that was 
universally held at that time was that custody decisions involved a 
definitive choice between one home and anothcr. 11 This understanding of 
the meaning of custody was not, of course, a product of the divorce 
rcvolution. 12 Rather, the law, as it then stood, provided a context in 
which it was possible to hold out to parents a promise of post-divorce 
autonomy once the custody issue had been settled. 13 
In this traditional conceptualization of what was involved in custody 
decision-making, visitation (or "access") was simply a "legal concession 
to the loscr." 14 Once this allocation had occurred, then people could get 
on with their lives with the past behind them. 15 The old marriage was 
dead and they could begin anew, repartner, and build a new family life 
with only residual ties to their former spouses. 16 Those ties were through 
child support obligations (which were poorly enforced), spousal 
maintenance where ordered, and ongoing visitation with the children. 
The consequence of this view of custody decision-making was that 
divorce involved a clean break in terms of parental responsibility once 
the issue of custody allocation was decided. In a perceptive article 
written in 1986, Irene Thery, the French sociologist, characterized the 
original divorce reform model as the substitution model of post-divorce 
parenting. 17 Under the substitute family model, the parents' legal divorce 
7. !d. 
8. /d.: see. e.g .. Lerner v. Superior Court of San Mateo Cnty .• 242 P.2d 321, 323 (Cal. 1952) 
("The essence of custody is the companionship of the child and the right to make decisions regarding 
his care and control, education, health, and religion."). 
9. PARKINSON, supra note I, at 22. 
I 0. !d. at 23. 
11. /d. 
12. /d. 
13. !d. 
14. LYNNE HALEM, DIVORCE REFORM: CHANGING LEGAL AND SOCIAL PERSPECTIVES 213 
14 (1980). 
15. PARKINSON, supra note I, at 24. 
16. !d. 
17. Irene Thery, 'The Interest ol the Child' and the Regulation of the Post-Divorce Family, 
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necessarily required a divorce between them not only as partners but also 
as parents. 1 R Only one of the two parents could continue in that role after 
the divorce, and the other's role would be no more than a visiting one in 
most cases. 19 The future upbringing of the child depended on a choice 
between two alternatives, the home of the mother or the home of the 
father. 20 It followed that the marriage breakdown marked the dissolution 
of the nuclear family? 1 Parental authority was awarded to the sole 
custodial parent and there was a strong differentiation between the role 
of the custodial and non-custodial parent. This way of seeing divorce was 
expressed pithily by the New York Court of Appeals in 1978: "Divorce 
dissolves the family as well as the marriage .... "22 
B. The Emergence ofthe Enduring Family 
It was not long after the first flush of the divorce revolution that this 
idea of post-separation parenting began to change. Thery argued, in her 
1986 article, that the substitution model of the post-separation family 
was gradually being displaced and that a new concept of post-separation 
parenting was emerging. 23 This, she called the idea of the "enduring 
family."24 In this conceptualization, divorce is a "transition between the 
original family unit and the re-organisation of the family which remains 
a unit, but a bipolar one."25 She noted that this conceptualization of post-
separation parenting implies the refusal of a choice between parents in 
favour of joint parental authority.26 
Change has occurred only very gradually in family law around the 
western world, but the relentless march of progress has been in the 
direction that ThCry anticipated. The history of family law reform in the 
last 20 years has seen the abandonment of the assumption that divorce 
could dissolve the family as well as the marriage when there are children. 
As Emeritus Prof. Margo Melli has written: "Today, divorce is not the 
end of a relationship but a restructuring of a continuing relationship."27 
14 INT'L. J. Soc. L. 341, 350-51, 354- 55 (1986 ). 
18. /d. at 350--51, 356. 
19. !d. 
20. !d. 
21. !d. at 354 55. 
22. Braiman v. Braiman, 378 N.E.2d 1019, 1022 (N.Y. 1978). 
23. Thery, supra note 17, at 355. 
24. !d. at 356--57. 
25. !d. at 356. 
26. !d. 
27. Marygold S. Melli, Whatever Happened to Divorce~, 2000 WiS. L. REV. 637,638 (2000); 
see also Brcn Neale & Carol Smart, In Whose Best Interests! TheorisinK Family Life FollowinK 
Parental Separation or Divorce, in UNDERCURRENTS OF DIVORCE 33,35 37 (Shelley Day Sclatcr & 
Christine Piper cds., 1999). 
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Marriage may be freely dissoluble, but parenthood is not. 
C. The Transformation in Custody Law 
The indissolubility of parenthood is seen in many different ways in 
modem family law. One aspect of it is financial. Child support is now 
vigorously enforced in many countries,n and in some jurisdictions 
spousal maintenance is experiencing a revival.29 However, the main way 
in which the indissolubility of parenthood is expressed is in terms of the 
law of parenting after separation. 
Reforms began in a relatively mild and largely semantic way with 
the shift in the USA in particular from the notion of sole custody to joint 
legal custody in the early 1980s.30 Pressure for a legal presumption that 
the court should award joint legal custody was particularly strong in 
North Amcrica,31 but it was also experienced in other western countries. 
However, in Europe, the law reform process took a different form 
from the joint custody movement in the United States. Rather than 
making joint custody (in the sense of joint legal responsibility) an option, 
or even establishing a presumption in favour of this, other countries 
made joint parental responsibility the default position in the absence of a 
court order to the contrary.32 
ln Britain, for example, a radical reconceptualization of post-
separation parenting occurred in 1989.33 On the recommendation of the 
Law Commission of England and Wales, the language of custody, 
guardianship, and access was abolished. 34 In its place, the Children Act 
of 1989 provided that each parent has "parental responsibility" and 
retains that responsibility after the marriage breakdown.35 Instead of 
making a custody order giving to one parent, to the exclusion of the 
other, a bundle of rights and powers to make decisions about the welfare 
of the child, the new law provided that court orders should focus on the 
practical issues. 36 Where will the child live? What contact arrangements 
need to be put in place? These orders are known as residence and contact 
2S. For a review of policies in the United States and other countries. sec CHILD SUPPORT: 
THE NEXT FRONTIER (J. Thomas Oldham & Marygold S. Melli cds., 2000). 
29. In Canada, sec Mogc v. Mogc, 119921 S.C.R. 813 (Can.); sec also AMERICAN LAW 
INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND 
RtTOMMI'NDATtONS ch. 5 (2002). 
30. PARKINSON, supra note ] , at 45. 
31. Andrew Schepard, Taking Children Seriously: Promoting Cooperative Custody Afier 
Divorce, 64 TEX. L. REV. 6'!1,7, 701 02 (1985). 
32. PARKINSON, supra note I, at 50. 
33. !d. 
34. !d. 
35. !d. 
36. !d. 
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orders. They say nothing about parental responsibility-that is, they do 
not carry with them a bundle of parental powers and responsibilities to 
the exclusion of the other parent, except to the practical extent required 
in the terms of the order.37 When a child is living primarily with one 
parent, that diminishes the non-resident parent's rights, powers, and 
responsibilities in a practical sense, to the extent that those rights, powers 
and responsibilities depend on the child living physically with that 
parent, but they are in all other respects unaffected by the parental 
separation. 38 The philosophy of the Children Act 1989 is that parental 
responsibility continues after separation as it existed before the 
relationship breakdown, subject to any orders to the contrary by the 
Court. 39 
Similar developments have also occurred in France, where the law is 
based upon a principle of "coparentalite."40 By legislation passed on 
January 8, 1993,41 the Civil Code was amended to remove the language 
of "custody."42 It was replaced with the language of "parental 
authority."43 The legislation provided that parental authority is to be 
exercised in common44 and that parental separation docs not change 
this.45 
In many other jurisdictions, the law has also been amended to 
encourage or provide for continuing joint parental responsibility after 
divorce. A common legislative approach which has had the effect of 
encouraging joint custody has been one of non-intervcntion.46 Instead of 
allocating custody as one of the matters to be dealt with in granting a 
divorce, joint custody is deemed to continue after separation unless one 
parent seeks a court order to the contrary.47 This was how joint custody 
became the norm in Sweden48 and Finland49 from the early 1980s 
37. /d. 
38. !d. 
39. Carol Smart, Wishful Thinking and Harmfid Tinkering! Sociological Reflections on 
Family Policy, 26 J. Soc. POI,'Y. 301, 315 ( 1997). 
40. Frederic Vauville, Du principe de coparentalite, 209 LES PETITES AFFICIIES 4 (2002). 
The "coparentalifl?' principle is also examined by Hugues Fulchiron in L 'autorite Parentale 
Renovix, REPERTOIRE DU NOTARIAT DEFRENOIS 959 (2002). 
41. Loi 93-22 du 8 janvier 1993 modifiant le code civil relative a l'etat civil, a Ia famille et 
aux droits de ]'enfant et instituant lc juge aux affaires familialcs [Law 93-22 of January 8, 1993 
Amending the Civil Code Relating to Civil Status, Family and Children's Rights, and Establishing 
the Family Court Judge], JOURNAL 0FFICIEL DE LA REPUBLJQUJ; FRAN<,:AISE [J.OJIOFFICIAL 
GAZETTE OF FRANCE j, Jan. 9, 1993, p. 495. 
42. In French, "Ia garde." 
43. PARKINSON, supra note I, at 52. 
44. C. Clv. art. 372 (Fr.). 
45. C. Clv. art. 373 2 (Fr.). 
46. PARKINSON, supra note I, at 54. 
47. !d. 
48. FORALDRABALKEN [FH] [Code Relating to Parents, Guardians, and Children] (Swed.). 
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onwards,50 and is now the position in the other Scandinavian countries as 
wcll. 51 A similar approach has been adopted in Germany by the Gcsctz 
zur Reform des Kindschaftrcchtcs, 1997,52 which amended the Civil 
Code to provide that the parents have joint parental responsibility during 
the marriage and unmarried parents may agree to joint parental 
responsibility by formal declaration. 53 This joint responsibility continues 
after separation unless the court orders otherwise on the application of 
f h . 54 one o t c partics.-
In all these jurisdictions, the effect of the legislative reforms is to 
reject the idea that there can be a parental divorce, except in cases where 
the court specifically orders that one parent will have sole parental 
responsibility. The legal divorce ends their relationship as spouses but 
not as parents. Indeed, it is now irrelevant in most jurisdictions whether 
the parents had been married at all. Biological parenthood, rather than 
marriage, is what gives rise to joint parental responsibility and enduring 
rights and obligations.55 
Whether or not parenthood is in practice indissoluble for primary 
caregivers (predominantly women) under these statutes depends to a 
great extent on the attitude of the non-resident parent. If a non-resident 
father desires to remain closely involved with his children, the new ideas 
on post-separation parenting give him much leverage. 
With the changes in legislative language about custody has come a 
profound change also in the nature of the question that courts arc asked 
to decide in custody disputes. This new approach towards post-separation 
parenting would have seemed radical to the family lawyers of previous 
generations, who assumed that divorce required a clear differentiation 
between the rights of the custodial and non-custodial parent. The 
consequence of this major shift in the focus of family law is that the 
promise of freedom to begin afresh that was held out as the meaning of 
49. Custody of Children and Rights of Access Act 1983 (Lag angiicnde viirdnad av bam och 
umgiingcsriitt H.4 19R3/361 ). 
50. Kirsti Kurki-Suonio, Joint Custody as an Interpretation of the Best Interest of the Child 
in a Critical and Comparative Perspective, 14 INT'L J. L. POL'Y & FAM. 183, 188 (2000). 
51. For Denmark, sec the Custody and Access Act 1995, Lov nr 387 af 14 juni 1995 om 
forceldrcmyndighed og sam veer. For Norway, see the Children and Parents Act 1981, Lov 1981-04-
0H nr. 7 om bam og foreldre. 
52. This legislation came into force on July I, 199H. The provisions on parental responsibility 
arc found in Book 4, chapter 5 of the Biirgerliches Gcsctzbuch. 
53. Biirgerlichcs Gesetzbuch I BGB I [Civil Code] § 1626. This article provides that the 
declaration needs to be publicly recorded, either before the Youth Welfare Department (Jugendamt) 
or a notary, subpara (d)( I). !d. 
54. Biirgerliches Gesetzbuch IBGB] [Civil Code]§ 1671. The applicant may seek that only 
part of the parental responsibility be conferred on them alone. !d. The change from joint parental 
responsibility to sole parental responsibility must be in the best interest of the child. !d. 
55. Sec PARKINSON, supra note I, at chapter 3 for a review of the law in ditlerent 
jurisdictions. 
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divorce in the divorce reform movements of the late 1960s and 1970s has 
proved to be somewhat empty where children arc involved. 
D. Encouraging the Involvement of Both Parents 
The demise of the concept of sole custody was, however, only the 
beginning of the transition that has occurred in the law of parenting after 
separation. Increasingly, legislation around the western world is 
emphasizing the importance of both parents being involved in children's 
lives. Whereas under the old substitution model of custody decision-
making, the choice was typically a binary one-a choice between the 
mother and the father as the custodial parent-now a spectrum of choices 
is available to the courts. In most cases, there will still be a primary 
custodian, a parent with whom the child lives for the majority of the 
time. However, the significance of that allocation to one parent or the 
other is not as great as it once was. The question has changed from being 
about which parent the child will live with to being about how the child's 
time will be shared between the parents. 
One way that involvement of non-resident parents has been 
supported has been by giving content to the notion of the "best interests 
of the child" by legislative findings or directions, or the statement of 
principles. An example of such a legislative direction is in the law m 
Missouri: 
The general assembly finds and declares that it is the public policy of 
this state that frequent, continuing and meaningful contact with both 
parents after the parents have separated or dissolved their marriage is in 
the best interest of the child, except for cases where the court 
specifically finds that such contact is not in the best interest 
of the child .... 56 
The formula of "frequent, continuing and meaningful contact" has 
echoes in the laws of a number of other jurisdictions in the United States, 
and is a recurring theme in statements of objects and principles. 57 
In most jurisdictions, legislatures have resisted the temptation to be 
too prescriptive about what time allocation between the parents will 
promote meaningful involvement.5g Courts have retained the flexibility 
to try to discern what will be in the best interests of the child in each 
case.59 Nonetheless, a common thread in legislation across America, and 
in other parts of the western world, has been towards the encouragement 
56. MO. ANN. STAT. ~452.375 (West 2011 ). 
57. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE~ 3020 (West 2011 ). 
58. PARKINSON, supra note I, at 97. 
59. /d. 
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of shared parenting after divorce. A number of jurisdictions now have 
legislation which gives some encouragement to consider shared 
parenting arrangements, and the trend in terms of law reform is strongly 
in that direction in situations where there are no issues of violence or 
abuse. 60 
France offers one example. The principle of "coparentalite," 
established in 1993, was strengthened by legislation enacted in 2002. 61 In 
particular, this legislation made clear that alternating residence (where 
the child spends an approximately equal amount of time with each 
parent) is an option. The background to this reform is that while 
amendments made in 1993 established the principle of joint parental 
authority after separation, the legislature, at that time, rejected the idea of 
alternating residence.62 However, some judges were persuaded to fix a 
primary residence, while allowing contact with the non-resident parent so 
extensive that the arrangements were equivalent, in practice, to an 
I . 'd 63 a ternatmg rest ence system. · 
Two commissions were established to advise the Government 
concerning possible reforms to the law of parental authority in the 
1990s.64 One took a sociological view, under the presidency of Irene 
Thcry. 65 The other focused more on legal issues under the presidency of 
Fran<;oise Dekeuwer-Dcfossez.66 The consequence of their proposals for 
reform, and subsequent governmental consideration, was legislation on 
parental authority passed in 2002.67 Article 373-2-9 of the Civil Code 
now provides that the residence of a child may be fixed alternately at the 
domicile of each of the parents or at the domicile of one of them. 68 The 
listing of alternating residence first, before sole residence, was intended 
to indicate encouragement of this option.69 
In Belgium, the law was amended in 2006 to provide encouragement 
60. !d. at 97 99. 
61. Loi 2002-305 du 4 mars 2002 relative ill'autorite parentale [Law 2002-305 of March 4, 
2002 on Parental Authority, 2002], JOURNAL 0FFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRAN<;:AISE 
[J.Oi10FFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCEJ, Mar. 5, 2002, p. 4161. 
62. This was implicit in the text, since the principle or a primary or usual residence was 
maintained, but explicit in the legislative debates. Hugues Fulehiron, supra note 40, at 959. 
63. See Hugues Fulchiron & Adeline Gouttenoire-Comut, Refbrmes Legislatives et 
Permanence des Pratiques: a Propos de Ia Generalisation de L 'exercice en Commun deL 'autorite 
l'arentale par Ia Loi du 8 Janvier /993, 1997 RECUEIL DALLOZ CIIRONIQUES 363 and the cases 
cited therein. 
64. I'ARKINSON,supranote !,at 102. 
65. IRi:NJ: TIIF:RY, COUPLE, FILIATION ET PARENTI' AUJOURD'HUI: LE DROIT FACE AUX 
MUTATIONS Dl' LA FAMILLI' I'T DE LA VIE I'RIYEE (1998). 
66. FRAN(,'OISE DEKEUWER-DEFOSSI!Z, RENOVER LE DROIT DF LA FAMILI.E: PROPOSITIONS 
POUR UN DROIT ADAPTE AUX REALI'ITS ET AUX ASPIRATIONS DE NOTRE TEMPS (1999). 
67. PARKINSON, supra note I, at I 02. 
68. !d. at I 03. 
69. !d. 
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for alternating residence-indeed that emphasis was expressed in the title 
of the legislation. 70 The law provides that when parents are in dispute 
about residency, the court is required to examine "as a matter of 
priority", the possibility of ordering equal residency if one of the parents 
requests it to do so. 71 The proviso is that if the court considers that equal 
residency is not the most appropriate arrangement, it may decide to order 
I "d 72 unequa rest ency. 
This is not the same as saying that there is a presumption in favour of 
equal time.73 An equal time arrangement is not presumed to be in the best 
interests of the child; nonetheless, according to Belgian law, it is the first 
option that ought to be considered when parents cannot agree on the 
arrangements. 74 In Australia, there have also been significant legislative 
reforms to encourage shared parenting, through the Family Law 
Amendment (Shared Parental Responsibility) Act 2006.75 One of the 
objectives of the Family Law Act, as amended by that legislation, is to 
ensure that "children have the benefit of both of their parents having a 
meaningful involvement in their lives, to the maximum extent consistent 
with the best interests of the child."76 This is importantly balanced by 
another object of the legislation, the need to protect children from 
physical or psychological harm from being subjected to, or exposed to, 
abuse, neglect or family violence which may necessitate restraints on 
contact by one parent.77 
The emphasis on the meaningful involvement of both parents in the 
absence of violence or abuse does not translate into a presumption of 
shared parenting, and still less, equal time.n The most that the legislation 
imposes by way of presumed outcome is a presumption in favour of 
equal shared parental responsibility. 79 This presumption is not applicable 
in cases where there is a history of violence or abuse. so If there is equal 
shared parental responsibility, parents have a duty to consult, and to try 
to reach agreement, on major decisions such as education, health, 
religion and changes in children's living arrangements, at least when that 
70. The Act of 18 July 2006 is entitled "Loi tendant a privileJ<ier I 'heberJ<ement ega/itaire de 
/'enfant dont /es parents sont separes et niglementant /'executionfimcee en matiere d'hebergement 
d'enjant." ("Law tending to favour equal residency for children of separated parents and regulating 
enforcement in child residency matters"). 
71. PARKINSON,supranote !,at 104. 
72. !d. 
73. !d. 
74. !d. 
75. /d. 
76. Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 60B (Austl.). 
77. !d. 
78. PARKINSON,supranote !,at 105. 
79. Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 61DA (Austl.). 
80. !d. 
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has a significant impact upon the ability of the other parent to spend time 
with the child. 81 
While equal shared parental responsibility says nothing, per se, about 
how time is allocated between parents-because the circumstances of 
separated families are so varied-there is at least strong encouragement 
in the legislation to consider shared parenting, and to do so positively.82 
First of all, the court has a duty to consider whether an equal time 
arrangement is in the best interests of the child and reasonably 
practicable.83 If equal time is not appropriate, then the court must 
consider what is termed "substantial and significant time," which ts 
defined in the following way: 
A child will be taken to spend substantial and significant time with a 
parent only if: 
(a) the time the child spends with the parent includes both: 
(i) days that fall on weekends and holidays; and 
(ii) days that do not fall on weekends or holidays; and 
(b) the time the child spends with the parent allows the parent to 
be involved in: 
(i) the child's daily routine; and 
(ii) occasions and events that arc of particular 
significance to the child; and 
(c) the time the child spends with the parent allows the child to be 
involved in occasions and events that arc of special 
. "fi h X4 s1gm 1cancc to t c parent. 
The best interests of the child remains the court's paramount 
concern.
85 Furthermore, the arrangement must be 'reasonably 
practicable'. 86 Australia's final court of appeal, the High Court of 
Australia, has indicated that unless the court makes a finding of fact that 
the arrangement for equal time or substantial and significant time is 
reasonably practicable, the court has no power to make such an order. 87 
The message of such legislative directions in these different 
jurisdictions are clear. Contact, visitation or access, howsoever it is 
described, is no longer the order a parent receives as a consolation if he 
or she loses the prize of custody. Nor is it to be the right only of a visitor, 
X I. PARKINSON. supra note I. 
X2. !d. 
X3. !d. 
84. Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 65DAA (Austl.). 
85. Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 60CA (Austl.). 
86. Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 65DAA (Austl.). 
87. MRR v GR (2010) 240 C.L.R. 461 (Austl.). 
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as the language of "visitation" might suggest. Rather, the assumption is 
that the time that the secondary parent has with the child will be such as 
to allow him or her a meaningful, continuing involvement in the life of 
the child. Fathers, in particular, are no longer to be marginaliscd by post-
separation parenting arrangements. 
Ill. PARENTING AFTER SEPARATION AND THE iSSUE OF 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
This transformation in the law of parenting after separation around 
the Western world has not been without controversy and has not 
occurred without serious resistance. In the main, that resistance has come 
from women's groups and feminist advocates for whom the sole custody 
model represented an optimal post-separation parenting arrangement-a 
kind of winner-takes-all, with the winner being almost invariably the 
mothcr.xx 
A. Custody and the Gender Wars 
The resistance to paternal involvement in parenting after 
separation-except to the extent that the mother wishes it-has had a 
long history. Over the years, various arguments have been made against 
joint custody and shared parenting time, or in favour of a primary 
caregiver presumption, when determining where the child will live. x9 
Changes to the law have been attacked as a reassertion of patriarchy,90 or 
as being motivated by fathers' rights rather than children's intcrcsts. 91 A 
88. See, e.g., Susan Boyd, Autonomyfi>r Mothers'! Relational Theory and Parenting Apart, 
18 FEMINIST LEGAL STUDIES 137, 150 (20 I 0) ("The responsibility cast upon mothers to ensure 
contact between children and fathers can be both a burden and a constraint on maternal autonomy."). 
89. See, e.g., CHILD CUSTODY AND TilE POLITICS OF GENDER, (Carol Smart & Selma 
Sevenhuijsen eds., 1989); MARY ANN MASON, THE CUSTODY WARS: WHY CHILDREN ARE LOSING 
THE LEGAL BATTLES AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT (1999); Jonathan Cohen and 
Nikki Gershbain, For the Sake of the Fathers? Child Custody Reji1rm and the Perils ol Maximum 
Contact 19 CAN. F.L.Q. 121 (200 I); SUSAN H. BOYD, CHILD CUSTODY, LAW, AND WOMEN'S WORK 
(2003). 
90. CAROL SMART, THE TIES THAT BIND: LAW, MARRIAGE, AND TilE RI'I'RODUCTION OF 
PATRIARCHAL RELATIONS (1984); Anne Marie Delorey, Joint Legal Custody: A Reversion to 
Patriarchal Power, 3 CAN. J. WOMEN & L. 33 (I 989); Dawn M. Bourque, "ReconstmctinJ(' the 
Patriarchal Nuclear Family: Recent Developments in Child Custody and Access in Canada, I 0 CAN. 
J. L. & Soc'Y. I (1995). 
91. Miranda Kaye & Julia Tolmic, Fathers' Rights Groups in Australia and Their 
Engagement with Issues in Family Law, 12 AUSTL. J. FAM. L. 19 (1998); Miranda Kaye & Julia 
Tolmie, Discoursing Dads: The Rhetorical Devices of Fathers' Rights Groups, 22 MEI.H. U. L. REV. 
I 62 (1998); FATHERS' RIGHTS ACTIVISM AND LEGAL REFORM (Richard Collier & Sally Sheldon 
eds., 2006); Richard Collier, Fathers' Rights, Gender and Welfare: Some Questionsfilr Family Law, 
31 J. Soc. WELFARE & FAM. L. 357 (2009); Leora N. Rosen, Molly Dragiewicz, & Jennifer C. 
Gibbs, Fathers· Rights Groups: Demographic Correlates and Impact on Custody Policy, 15 
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 5 I 3 (2009). 
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perennial argument is that men just want to have more time with their 
children in order to reduce child support-an argument for which there is 
plenty of anecdotal evidence in relation to the motives of some men, but 
which is also grossly overstated and demeaning to many devoted 
fathers. 92 
Family law has thus become heavily politiciscd and children have 
been caught in the middle of this gender war. Around the western world, 
the conflict between the different lobby groups has eventuated in huge 
territorial battles that are, rightly or wrongly, perceived as having some 
strategic value. Every gain by men's groups in altering the language of 
legislation-however symbolic or trivial-is seen as a loss by women's 
groups. Conversely, gains by women's groups arc mourned as a loss to 
fathers. 
In recent years, the fierce arguments against laws that encourage and 
support paternal involvement have focused not so much on attacking the 
motives of fathers, but on a concern that laws which support greater 
paternal involvement in children's lives put the safety of women and 
children at risk.93 The need to protect women and children from violence 
and abuse is a powerful and highly emotive argument. Indeed, it is the 
nuclear weapon of the gender war concerning parenting arrangements 
after separation. 
It deserves to be taken very seriously as an issue. Many women and 
children arc at risk from male violence and abuse before, during, and 
after scparation.94 It is appropriate that an absolute priority be given to 
the safety of victims of violence and their children when there is a 
serious risk of harm. Whether that safety is best achieved by restricting 
the involvement of non-violent fathers and by opposing any 
encouragement of shared care, is another question. 
How can the protection of victims of violence be given an absolute 
priority when the law in general promotes the indissolubility of 
parenthood? Is there an irreconcilable tension between them that requires 
a reversal of the trends of the last thirty years and a reversion to a norm 
of sole female custody? Is there a case for a presumption against fathers 
having contact with their children where there has been a history of 
violence? Put differently, when is parenthood dissoluble? 
Exploration of these issues requires first of all an examination of the 
nature and prevalence of family violence, or intimate partner violence, as 
92. PARKINSON, supra note I, at 40. 
93. For a review of the debates in four countries, see Peter G. Jaffe & Claire V. Crooks, 
Partner Violence and Child Custody Cases: A Cross-National Comparison of Legal Refiwms and 
Issues, 10 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 917 (2004). See also Michael Flood, "Fathers" Rights .. and 
the Dej"ense ofPaternal Authority in Australia, 16 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 328 (201 0). 
94. Seel'ARKlNSON,supranotc I, at 121 128. 
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it is otherwise called, and then consideration of the legislative strategies 
which have been advanced to address the problem in the age of the 
enduring family. One of the greatest problems in developing sensible 
policy in this difficult area is that there is a discordance between the 
simplistic rhetoric surrounding domestic violence in public policy and 
the more complex picture derived from social science research. To 
develop sound policy, it is necessary to move beyond the rhetoric and to 
differentiate between types of violence within intimate personal 
relationships. There is a consensus on this amongst leading experts in the 
field in the USA and elsewhere, but it is not a consensus which has, to 
date, been translated into good legislative policy in mostjurisdictions. 95 
IV. THE NATURE AND PREY ALENCE OF INTIMATE 
PARTNER VIOLENCE 
Violence is a pervasive and common problem in all intimate 
relationships. A general population survey in Canada, for example, found 
that 8.6% of women and 7% of men reported some kind of physical 
abuse from a current or ex-partner within the last five years. 96 Women 
reported much more severe abuse.97 
Levels of abuse and violence are particularly high in intimate 
relationships between those under 30. ln one major study in New 
Zealand, domestic conflict was present in 70% of the intimate 
relationships of 25 year olds, with this conflict ranging from mmor 
psychological abuse to severe assault.9~ 
It is unsurprising therefore that histories of violence and abuse 
should be common amongst families who have separated. The 
pervasiveness of violence and abuse among parents who have separated 
is evident in Australian research. Sheehan and Smyth, reporting on 
interviews with a general population of separated parents, found that 
65% of women and 55% of men indicated that they had experienced 
violence against them within the criminal law definition of assault. 99 
Fifty-three percent of women and 24% of men reported violence or 
95. Nancy Vcr Steegh & Clare Dalton, Reportjrom the Wingspread Conference on Domestic 
Violence and Family Court, 46 FAM. Cr. REV. 454 (2008). 
96. Sarah Romans, et al., Who is Most at Riskj(Jr Intimate Partner Violence? A Canadian 
Population-Based Study, 22 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 1495, 1495 (2007). 
97. !d. 
98. These were findings from the longitudinal Christchurch Health and Development Study. 
David M. Fergusson, L. John Horwood & Elizabeth M. Ridder, Partner Violence and Mental Health 
Outcomes in a New Zealand Birth Cohort, 67 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. II 03, II 03 (2005). 
99. Grania Sheehan & Bruce Smyth, Spousal Violena and Post-separation Financial 
Outcomes, 14 AUSTL. J. FAM. L. 102, I 09 (2000). 
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threats of violence that induced fear. 10° Fourteen percent of women, and 
3% of men reported injuries resulting from violence that required 
medical treatmcnt. 101 
Parents who need the assistance of the courts and related services to 
resolve their disputes arc likely to report particularly high levels of 
violence and abuse. This is evident, for example, in a study of 864 
former couples using free, court-mandated mediation in Arizona. 102 
Asked about that relationship in the last twelve months, 58% of women 
and 54% of men reported some physical abuse, such as pushing, shoving, 
punching, biting or scratching perpetrated against them. 103 Sixty-two 
percent of women and 50% of men reported escalated abuse perpetrated 
against them. 104 Escalated abuse included such violence as broken bones, 
choking, and threats of, or actual usc of weapons, strangling or 
suffocating. 105 Fifty-six per cent of women and 29% of men reported 
sexual abuse. 106 Ninety-eight per cent of women and 97% of men 
reported at least one incident of psychological abuse in the last 12 
months. 107 That was defined by such items as putting the person down, or 
insulting them or shaming them in front of othcrs. 10x While respondents 
did not indicate that this abuse was a frequent or regular occurrence, the 
high incidence of complaints of abuse in a court-mandated cohort 
indicates how commonly litigants in family law disputes may be able to 
point to behavior which falls within the definition of violence or abuse in 
family law statutes-and particularly in those that have a broad 
definition that includes emotional abuse, verbal abuse, economic abuse 
and social isolation within the definition of "violence." 
There has been a very strong tendency in the past, especially in the 
academic legal literature, to define domestic violence in a homogenous 
way as being perpetrated mainly or entirely by men, and characterised by 
a desire to control and oppress women. The statistics on the prevalence 
of violence, and the extent to which men report victimisation (albeit that 
the violence tends to be less serious) do not sit comfortably with such a 
one-size-fits-all charactcrization. 109 The problem with treating domestic 
100. !d. 
I 0 I. !d. 
I 02. Connie J. A. 13eck, Michele E. Walsh & Rose Weston, Analysis of' Mediation Agreements 
ojFamilies Reporting Specific Types of' Intimate Partner Abuse, 47 FAM. CT. REV. 401 (2009). 
I 03. !d. at 401.407. 
104. !d. at 40 I. 
105. !d. at 406. 
106. !d. at 40 I. 
107. /d. 
108. !d. at 407. 
I 09. The research evidence from general population studies make it clear that both women and 
men engage in physically aggressive altercations in intimate relationships. In a meta-analysis of 82 
studies, it was found that women were slightly more aggressive than men. John Archer, Sex 
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violence as homogenous is that it leads to one-size-fits-all responses in 
terms of legislation and public policy. 
Reflection on the social science evidence has led to an emerging 
consensus about the need to distinguish between different patterns of 
violence. That differentiation is also significant in terms of assessing the 
risk to parents and children and the likelihood that parent-child contact 
can be made safe for the future. 110 
Thirty years of research on domestic violence has now established 
that there is a variety of different patterns of violent conflict between 
intimate partners. 111 The terminology used by researchers varies, but 
broadly they describe similar categorizations of violence within intimate 
relationships. The research also includes both heterosexual and same-sex 
relationships. 112 There are differences of view as to whether intimate 
partner violence is best explained by typologies, or should rather be seen 
as a continuum from mild conflict to severe controlling violence and 
homicide. 113 These differences of conceptualizations do not diminish the 
Differences in Aggression Between Heterosexual Partners: A Meta-analytic Review. 126 PSYCHOL. 
BULL. 651 (2000). While many of these studies rely on usc of the Conflict Tactics Scale (Murray 
Straus, Measuring Intrafamily Conflict and Violence: The Conflict Tactics (CT) Scales, 41 J. 
MARRIAGE & FAM. 75 ( 1979)), the same patterns are discerned using other measures. This research 
has proven highly controversial for those committed to a single causal factor theory of domestic 
violence centred in patriarchy and male control. For a discussion ofthis topic, sec Murray A. Straus, 
Future Research on Gender Symmetry in Physical Assaults on Partners, 12 VIOLENCE AGAINST 
WOMEN 1086 (2006). A single causal factor theory of domestic violence also docs not take account 
of the perspectives of women from positions of difference, including indigenous women and 
lesbians. See Rosemary Hunter, Narratives of Domestic Violence, 2X SYD. L. RI!V. 733, 744-49 
(2006). 
II 0. Peter Jaffe et. al., Custody Disputes Involving Allegations of Domestic Violence: The 
Need.fiJr Differentiated Approaches to Parenting Plans, 46 FAM. Cr. REV. 500 (200X); Bruce Smyth 
et. a/., Allegations of' Family Violence and Child Abuse in Children's Proceedings: A Pre-refiJrm 
Empirical Snapshot, 21 AUSTRALIAN J. FAM. L. 252 (2007); Janet Johnston, Domestic Violence 
and Parent-Child Relationships in Families Disputing Custody, 9 AUSTL. J. FAM. L. 12 ( 1995). 
Ill. Janet Johnston & Linda Campbell, A Clinical Typology oj'Interparental Violence in 
Disputed-custody Divorces, 63 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 190 (1993); Joan B. Kelly & Michael P. 
Johnson, Diff'erentiation Among Types of Intimate Partner Violence: Research Update and 
Implications for Interventions, 46 FAM. CT. REV. 476 (2008); Nancy Ver Stccgh, Differentiating 
Types of Domestic Violence: ImplicationsfiJr Child Custody, 65 LA. L. REV. 1379 (2005); Stacey 
Williams & Irene Frieze, Patterns ol Violent Relationships, Psychological Distress, and Marital 
Satisfaction in a National Sample of Men and Women, 52 SEX ROLES 771 (2005). 
112. For discussion on violence in gay and lesbian relationships, sec, for example, Mary 
Eaton, Abuse by Any Other Name: Feminism, /Jiff'erence, and Intra-Lesbian Violence. in MARTHA 
FINEMAN & ROXANNE MYKITIUK, TilE PUBLIC NATURE OF PRIVATE VIOLENCE 195 (1994); CLAIRE 
RENZETTI & CHARLES MILEY, VIOLENCE IN GAY AND LESBIAN OOMI'STIC PARTNERSIIIPS (1996); Gail 
Mason, Boundaries of' Sexuality: Lesbian Experience and Feminist Discourse on Violence Against 
Women, 7 AUSTRALASIAN GAY & LESBIAN L. J. 41 (1997); Dena Hassouneh & Nancy Glass, 'lhe 
Influence of' Gender Role Stereotyping on Women's Experiences of Female Same-Sex Intimate 
Partner Violence, 14 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 310 (2008). There arc some indications that rates 
of domestic violence in same-sex relationships may be higher than in heterosexual relationships. Lee 
Vickers, The Second Closet: Domestic Violence in Lesbian and Gay Relationships: A Western 
Australian Perspective 3(4) ELAW JOURNAL: TilE MURDOCII U. ELECTRONIC J. L. ( 1996) ,1,1 17-22. 
113. Michael Johnson, Domestic Violence: It's Not About Gender--Or is it~, 67 J. MARRIAGE 
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level of consensus amongst social science researchers concerning the 
heterogeneity of what is termed "family violence." 
Four types of violence arc commonly described in the literature, 
sometimes under different names. These are: coercive controlling 
violence, violence driven by conflict, violent resistance, and separation-
instigated violence. While these categorizations are useful for 
understanding the dynamics of individual family relationships and 
identifying the degree of risk involved in proposed arrangements for 
parenting after separation, it should not be thought that they arc entirely 
discrete categories. Each intimate partner relationship has its own unique 
c d h . . . b 114 JCaturcs an t ere IS some continUity ctwccn types. 
A. Coercive Controlling Violence 
When domestic violence first emerged into public and professional 
consciousness through the efforts of the women's movement, domestic 
violence was primarily understood in terms of wife-battering, and was 
associated with a variety of forms of intimidation and control which 
extended beyond physical violence or the threat of it. Women who report 
coercive controlling violence report a pattern of intimidation, social 
isolation, and control as well as assault. 115 Behaviours include economic 
control, verbal abuse and emotional abusc. 116 This form of coercive 
controlling violence, 117 or "intimate terrorism", as Johnson has called 
it, 11 x involves male perpetrators and female victims almost without 
exception. The period around separation can be a particularly dangerous 
time for women who are victims of coercive, controlling violence. 119 
Such coercive controlling violence certainly justifies sole custody to 
& FAM. 1126 (2005); David Fergusson, John Horwood & Elizabeth Ridder, Response to Johnson, 67 
J. MARRJM;E & FAM. 1131 (2005). 
114. Janet Johnson, Re.1ponse to Clare Dalton's "When Paradigms Collide: Protecting 
Battered Parents and Their Children in the Family Court System", 37 FAM. & CONCILIATION CTS. 
RI v. 422, 426 ( 1999). 
115. PARKINSON,supranote !,at 125. 
116. !d. 
117. Mary Ann Dutton & Lisa Goodman, Coercion in Intimate Partner Violence: Toward a 
New Conc<!ptualization, 52 SEX ROLES 743 (2005). 
118. Michael P. Johnson, Conflict and Control: Gender Symmetry and A.1ymmet1y in Domestic 
Violence, 12 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMI'N I 003 (2006) ]hereinafter Johnson, Conflict and Control]. 
He used to call it "patriarchal" terrorism. See Michael 1'. Johnson, Patriarchal Terrorism and 
Common Couple Violence: Two Forms of Violence Against Women, 57 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 283 
( 1995) [hereinafter Johnson, Patriarchal Terrorism]. The use of the language of "terrorism" in 
relation to domestic violence may be traced to LEWIS 0KUN, WOMAN ABUSE: FACTS REPLACING 
MYTHS (1986), who used the term "conjugal terrorism." 
119. Margo Wilson & Martin Daly, Spousal Homicide Risk and Hstrangement, 8 VIOLENCE & 
VICTIMS 3 ( 1993); PATRICIA EASTEAL, KILLING THE BELOVED: HOMICIDE BETWEEN ADULT 
SEXUAl. INTIMATES 85 87 (1993); Holly Johnson & Tina Holton, Losing Control: Homicide Risk in 
lo"stranged and Intact Intimate Relationships, 7 HOMICIDE STUD. 58 (2003 ). 
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the other parent and in the most serious cases, a denial of contact with 
h 'd 11 120 t c non-res1 ent parent at a . 
B. Intimate Partner Conflict and Violence 
While the patterns of violence most often seen by police, women's 
refuge workers, and hospital emergency wards is coercive controlling 
violence, in general community studies, the patterns of violence in 
families often involve different dynamics. 121 The majority ofthc violence 
revealed in such community studies is not coercive controlling violence, 
but what researchers have variously classified as "conflict instigated 
violence," 122 "common couple violence", 123 "situational couple 
violence" 124 or, in the language of the US Wingspread Conference, 
"violence driven by conflict." 125 The Wingspread Conference defined 
this as follows: 
This type of violence takes place when an unresolved disagreement 
spirals into a violent incident, but the violence is not part of a larger 
pattern of coercive control. It may be initiated by either the male or 
female partner. However, female victims arc more likely to suffer 
negative consequences, including injury, than are men. 126 
Violence driven by conflict typically involves intimate partners losing 
control, rather than using violence to assert it. 127 In their anger, either 
partner or both may usc verbal abuse or emotional abuse. tn Arguments 
may escalate into hitting, punching and throwing things, 129 but the 
incidence of injuries resulting from this is not nearly as great as would be 
seen in coercive controlling violence. 130 Nor are the relational dynamics 
the same. Women who report coercive controlling violence report a 
pattern of intimidation, isolation, and control as well as assault. 131 For 
120. Helen Rhoades, The 'No Contact Mother': Reconstructions of Motherhood in the Era of 
the 'New Father', 161NT'L1. L. POL'Y & FAM. 71 (2002). 
121. PARKINSON, supra note I, at 126. 
122. Jaffe et al., supra note II 0. 
123. Johnson, Patriarchal Terrorism, supra note 118, at 283. 
124. Kelly & Johnson, supra note Ill. 
125. Nancy Vcr Steegh & Clare Dalton, Report/rom the WingYpread Conf'erence on Domestic 
Violence and Family Court, 46 FAM. CT. REV. 454 (2008). 
126. !d. at 458. 
127. MICHAEL JOHNSON, A TYPOLOGY OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: INTIMATE TERRORISM, 
VIOLENT RESISTANCE, AND SiTUATIONAL COUPLE VIOLENCE 60--71 (2008). 
128. PARKINSON, supra note I, at 126. 
129. Michael Johnson & Kathleen Ferraro, Research on Domestic Violence in the 1990s: 
Making Distinctions, 62 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 948, 949 (2000). 
130. Nicola Graham-Kevan & John Archer, Physical Aggression and Control in Heterosexual 
Relationships: The Eff'ect of Sampling Procedure, 18 VIOLENCE AND VICTIMS 181 (2003); Kelly & 
Johnson supra note Ill, at 481. 
]31. PARKINSON,supranote !,at 126. 
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this reason, Ellis and Stucklcss have drawn the fundamental distinction 
between conflict-initiated and control-initiated violencc. 132 
While violence driven by conflict predominates in general 
community studies, coercive controlling violence is much more common 
in cases that go to court and for women in domestic violence shelters. 133 
Michael Johnson, reviewing Frieze's U.S. data from the 1970s 134 derived 
from the general community, courts, and women's shelters, classified the 
patterns of violence within that study in accordance with four 
categorizations: mutual violent control, intimate terrorism, violent 
resistance and situational couple violcnce. 135 Focusing on wives' reports 
of violence by husbands, he reported that 89% of the violence in a 
general community sample was best characterised as situational couple 
violence, and II% was intimate terrorism. In the court sample, only 29% 
of the violence was situational couple violence and 68% was intimate 
terrorism. In the sample of women who had been in shelters, 19% of the 
violence was situational couple violence and 79% was intimate 
tcrrorism. 136 
C. Other Patterns of"Jntimate Partner Violence 
Coercive controlling violence and violence driven by conflict are not 
the only patterns of violence identified in rcsearch. 137 Violent resistance 
and separation-instigated violence have also been identified. 138 Violent 
resistance is most commonly seen when women respond to coercive 
controlling violence by male partncrs. 139 It is force used in self-defence. 
Separation-instigated violence was identified by Johnston and 
Campbell who observed, in their studies of ongoing and entrenched 
disputes over post-separation parenting, that there was a group of parents 
where uncharacteristic acts of violence were precipitated by the 
separation or were reactions to traumatic post-divorce evcnts. 140 In these 
cases, violence occurred only during or after the separation period and 
132. DESMOND ELLIS & NOREEN STUCKLESS, MEDIATING AND NEGOTIATING MARITAL 
CoNFLICTS ( 1996 ). 
133. PARKINSON,supranote I, at 127. 
134. Irene Frieze, Investigating the Causes and Consequences of Marital Rape, 8 SIGNS 532 
(1983); Irene Frieze & Angela Browne, Violence in Marria~;e, in FAMILY VIOLENCE 163 (Lloyd 
Ohlin & Michael Tonry eds., 1989); Irene Frieze & Maureen McHugh, Power and Influence 
Strategies in Violent and Nonviolent Marriage, 16 PSYCHOL. WOMEN Q. 449 ( 1992). 
135. Johnson, Conflict and Control, supra note 118, at I 003. 
136. !d. at I 0 I I. 
137. PARKINSON, supra note I, at 128. 
138. See Kelly & Johnson, supra note 111. 
139. !d. 
140. Johnston & Campbell, supra note 111, at 196- 97. 
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was not present during the marriage itself. 141 They noted that physical 
violence was perpetrated by the partner who felt abandoncd. 142 
D. Implicationsfor Policy 
These different patterns of violence in families require a 
differentiated response in considering the relevance of violence to 
parenting arrangements. In particular, there is a need to differentiate 
conflict-driven violence from control-driven violence. The language of 
"victim" and "perpetrator," "abused parent" and "violent parent" docs 
not easily fit with the nature of violence driven by conflict and nor docs 
an analysis that insists that only one gender is responsible, even if the 
patterns of female violence within intimate partnerships arc different 
from male violcnce. 143 This is important in thinking about whether a 
history of using violence should give rise to a presumption against 
having primary care or even allowing parent-child contact. Such laws 
have potential for vast overreach because so many women and men may 
be caught in the net. Laws which assume there is just one 'perpetrator' 
and one 'victim' are not well-suited to deal with conflict-driven violence. 
V. INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE AND LEGISLATION ON 
POST-SEPARATION PARENTING 
Legislatures around the western world have addressed the issue of 
violence and its relationship to decision-making about children, in a 
variety of different ways. 144 At one end of the spectrum arc legislatures 
which have given very little guidance to courts at all, concerning how to 
determine the best interests of children; or, if they have a list of factors to 
consider, do not mention domestic violence as an issue. 145 One example 
of this is the Children Act 1989 in Britain. In determining the welfare of 
the child, courts are required to consider a range of factors, and while 
harm to the child is a consideration, the violence of one parent towards 
another is not listed as a specific matter to which the court should direct 
. . 
146 G 'd h h l b . b I 147 d Its attentiOn. m ance as nonct c css ccn gtvcn y case aw an 
141. !d. 
142. !d. 
143. See, e.g., Russell Dobash & Rebecca Dobash, Women's Violence to Men in Intimate 
Relationships: Working on a Puzzle, 44 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 324 (2004); MARIANNE HESTER, 
WHO DOES WHAT TO WHOM? GENDER AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE PERPETRATORS (2009), available 
at http://www.bristol.ac.uk/sps/rcseareh/projects/reports/2009!tj4843/whodoeswhat.pdf (last visited 
March 3, 20 12). 
144. PARKINSON, supra note I, at 133. 
145. !d. 
146. The factors listed in the Children Act, 1989, c.41, § 1(3) (Eng.), arc: the ascertainable 
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by a Practice Direction issued by the President of the Family Division of 
the High Court. 14R 
Other jurisdictions have sought to identify violence as a specific 
consideration in legislation, with a focus on acts of violence that can be 
proven. In some states, there is just a general requirement to take acts of 
violence into account. The law in New York illustrates this: 
Where either party to an action concerning custody of or a right to 
visitation with a child alleges ... that the other party has committed an 
act of domestic violence against the party making the allegation or a 
family or household member of either party ... and such allegations 
arc proven by a preponderance of the evidence, the court must consider 
the effect of such domestic violence upon the best interests of the child, 
together with such other facts and circumstances as the court deems 
relevant in making a direction pursuant to this section and state on the 
record how such findings, facts and circumstances factored into the 
direction. 149 
Three features of this legislation are noteworthy. First, the legislation 
docs not specify how the act of domestic violence is to be taken into 
account other than that the court must consider what effect the violence 
has on the wellbeing of the child. Secondly, it focuses attention on a 
history of domestic violence rather than current safety concerns. Thirdly, 
it defines domestic violence in terms of incidents of assault, rather than 
in terms of the impact of that assault on the victim and the relational 
context within which that physical violence occurs. For female victims of 
coercive controlling violence, physical abuse is just one dimension of an 
oppressive relationship which subjugates, entraps, and disempowers. 
wishes and feelings of the child concerned (considered in the light of his age and understanding); his 
physical, emotional and educational needs; the likely effect on him of any change in his 
circumstances; his age, sex, background and any characteristics of his which the court considers 
relevant; any harm which he has suflered or is at risk of suffering; how capable each of his parents, 
and any other person in relation to whom the court considers the question to be relevant, is of 
meeting his needs; and the range of powers available to the court under this Act in the proceedings in 
question. 
147. The English Court of Appeal reconsidered its approach in Re L (a child) (contact: 
domestic violence), 12001] Fam. 260 in response to a great deal of criticism that the courts were 
insensitive to the victims of domestic violence. For criticisms in Britain of the failure to recognise 
adequately the problem of domestic violence and other situations in which shared parental 
responsibility and regular contact is contra-indicated, sec John Eekelaar, Rethinking Parental 
Responsihilif)', 31 FAM. L. 426 (200 I); John Eekclaar, Contact Over the Limit?, 32 FAM. L. 271 
(2002); JANE FORTIN, CIIILDREN'S RIGHTS AND THE DI'VELOPING LAW 401-413 (2d ed. 2003). 
148. Practice Direction: Residence and Contact Orders: Domestic Violence and Harm, 
FAMILYLAWWEEK.CO.UK, http://www.familylawweek.co.uk/site.aspx?i~ed31300 (last updated Jan. 
14, 2009). 
149. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW§ 240(1) (2010). 
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A. Domestic Violence as Incidents 
Characterising domestic violence in terms of incidents of assault 
places the focus on provable incidents of assault, each as a discrete 
crime, rather than the ongoing experience of coercive controlling 
violence of victims of this pattern of family violence. Evan Stark's 
observations are apposite: 
With a few exceptions, our field has been dominated by a definition 
adapted from criminology that equates abuse with discrete episodes of 
force designed or likely to hurt or injure a partner. One result of the 
incident-specific violence definition is that criminal justice intervention 
has failed to affect the problem. Because the vast majority of domestic 
violence involves "minor" assaults (e.g., pushes, shoves), when the law 
requires police and the courts to view abuse through the prism of 
discrete acts of violence, woman battering is downgraded to a second-
class misdemeanor . . . The emphasis on discrete acts of violence 
contrasts markedly with experience-based accounts where battered 
women report abuse is "ongoing"; includes a pattern of intimidation, 
isolation, and control as well as assault; and exacts high levels of fear 
and entrapment even when violence has stopped. Nor docs the 
paradigm account for the duration of abusive relationships. A related 
issue is that the harms victims identify are more often the cumulative 
result of ongoing "entrapment" than of discrete assaults, a fact that 
k · · · kiW rna es mJury a poor way to assess ns . · 
The treatment of domestic violence in terms of provable events has a 
number of deficiencies. First, if the assaults were intermittent and not at 
the most serious end of the spectrum of violence in terms of physical 
injury, a court which is focused on discrete and provable incidents of 
criminal conduct may minimise the significance of the assaults in terms 
of the woman's overall experience ofvictimisation. 
A second issue with the focus on provable incidents of violence 
derives from the binary nature of fact-finding. Either an assault is proven 
or it is not. The abuse happened, or it did not. In law, a finding of "not 
guilty" is equated with innocence. Domestic violence occurs behind 
closed doors. Victims may not be able to recall many incidents of 
violence with the specificity concerning dates and circumstances needed 
to prove an incident to the satisfaction of a court. The police may only 
have been called on two or three occasions out of many. The laws of 
evidence may constrain what evidence is admissible. 151 It follows that 
150. Evan Stark, Commentary, Conflict and Control: Gender Symmetry and A.lymmi'try in 
Domestic Violence, 12 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 1019, 1019 20 (2006) (internal citations 
omitted). 
151. See generally, Jane H. Aiken & Jane C. Murphy, Evidence Issues in Dom<'stic Violence 
Civil Cases, 34 FI\M. L. Q. 43 (2000). 
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where the focus is on provable events rather than the experience of 
oppression in its relational context, what is recorded as the violent events 
may wcii understate the significance of that history in terms of decision-
making about parenting after separation. 
While these considerations go to the risk that a history of power and 
control, backed up with the threat of or occurrence of violent assaults, 
wiiJ not be given sufficient weight by the courts, there is also a concern 
of a different kind about this focus on a provable event of violence. It 
may cast the net too wide. If the majority of both women and men who 
have been separated or divorced report physical assaults in the course of 
their previous relationship, albeit in many cases assaults such as pushing 
and hitting that did not occasion physical injury, then a substantial 
proportion of the population, both men and women, may be covered by 
legislation that requires courts to respond in certain ways to any proven 
history of assault. 
Like driftncts in ocean fishing, laws on family violence may capture 
a lot of fish within them which arc not the targets of the operation. A 
pattern of coercive controlling violence is highly relevant to the question 
of post-separation parenting arrangements; so too are other threats to the 
ongoing safety of parents and children following separation. But laws 
designed to address these patterns of violence and ongoing safety 
concerns, if drafted in too wide a way, can catch up in the net any case 
where there has been a provable history of physical altercation within the 
relationship, by either mothers, fathers, or both. That is, it catches in the 
net any incidents of violence driven by conflict, at any stage of the 
relationship. 
B. Presumptions Against Custody 
In some U.S. states, there is a presumption against custody being 
awarded in favour of someone who has been proved to have committed 
an act of violence against the other parent or one of the children. 152 In 
these states, the failure to differentiate between types of family violence 
and the focus on individual incidents may well lead to over-inclusive 
presumptions. The issue may be illustrated by the law in California, 
which has a presumption against any form of legal custody, including 
joint legal custody, if a parent has perpetrated a domestic assault in the 
last five years. Section 3044 of the California Family Code provides: 
(a) Upon a finding by the court that a party seeking custody of a child 
152. On the ctlectivcncss of these provisions, see Allison C. Morrill eta!., Child Custody and 
Visitation Decisions When the Father Has Perpetrated Violence Against the Mother, II VIOLENCE 
AGAINST WOMl'N I 076 (2005). 
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has perpetrated domestic violence against the other party seeking 
custody of the child or against the child or the child's siblings 
within the previous five years, there is a rebuttable presumption 
that an award of sole or joint physical or legal custody of a child to 
a person who has perpetrated domestic violence is detrimental to 
the best interest of the child, pursuant to Section 30 II. This 
presumption may only be rebutted by a preponderance of the 
evidence. 
(b) In determining whether the presumption set forth in subdivision (a) 
has been overcome, the court shall consider all of the following 
factors: 
( 1) Whether the perpetrator of domestic violence has 
demonstrated that giving sole or joint physical or legal 
custody of a child to the perpetrator is in the best interest 
of the child. In determining the best interest of the child, 
the preference for frequent and continuing contact with 
both parents . . . may not be used to rebut the 
presumption, in whole or in part. 
(2) Whether the perpetrator has successfully completed a 
batterer's treatment program that meets the criteria 
outlined in subdivision (c) of Section 1203.097 of the 
Penal Code. 
(3) Whether the perpetrator has successfully completed a 
program of alcohol or drug abuse counseling if the court 
determines that counseling is appropriate. 
( 4) Whether the perpetrator has successfully completed a 
parenting class if the court determines the class to be 
appropriate. 
(5) Whether the perpetrator is on probation or parole, and 
whether he or she has complied with the terms and 
conditions of probation or parole. 
(6) Whether the perpetrator is restrained by a protective order 
or restraining order, and whether he or she has complied 
with its terms and conditions. 
(7) Whether the perpetrator of domestic violence has 
committed any further acts of domestic violence. 153 
If both men and women have used violence in the course of the 
relationship, (whatever the context), a presumption against having sole or 
joint custody may well apply to both parents, with the outcome of the 
case influenced by the extent to which either parent can prove particular 
incidents of assault to the satisfaction of the court. 
153. CA FAM. CODE~ 3044 (2004). 
2] WHEN IS PARENTHOOD DISSOLUBLE 171 
If this approach were applied only to the more severe cases of 
coercive, controlling violence, an outcome that was both just to the 
victim and likely to be in the best interests of the children, would result. 
Coercive, controlling violence against an intimate partner is a window to 
the soul. It reveals much about the character of a person. It is likely to be 
indicative of a tendency to dominate and control the children rather than 
to nurture and empower them. There is a strong likelihood of ongoing 
issues about the safety of the mother and of high levels of conflict 
between the parents. 
However, laws which arc really targeting men who engage in 
coercive, controlling violence, where any form of joint parenting is likely 
to be contra-indicated, may apply to very different patterns of conflict 
which do not give rise to ongoing safety concerns. The legislation in 
California is particularly problematic because it appears that even one 
physical assault triggers the presumption, and it may be applied of course 
to both genders whenever a physical assault can be proven to occur, 
whatever the circumstances and whether or not any harm has resulted. 
Presumptions of this kind are blunt instruments for dealing with mutual 
aggressiOn. 
C. Presumption Against Unsupervised Visitation 
New Zealand goes further than other jurisdictions in having a 
presumption against unsupervised contact when a parent has committed 
an act of violence. 154 Sections 60 and 61 of the Care of Children Act 
2004 provide that if the court is satisfied that a party to the proceedings 
has used violence against the child or a child of the family, or against the 
other party to the proceedings, then "the court must not make an order 
giving the violent party the role of providing day-to-day care for the 
child ... or any order allowing the violent party contact (other than 
supervised contact) with that child," unless "the court is satisfied that the 
child will be safe" with the violent party. "In considering ... whether a 
child will be safe, ... the court must ... have regard to: the nature and 
seriousness of the violence used; how recently the violence occurred; the 
frequency of the violence; the likelihood of further violence occurring; 
the physical or emotional harm caused to the child by the violence; 
whether the other party to the proceedings-considers that the child will 
be safe while the violent party provides day-to-day care for, or has 
154. For the origins of these provisions, and early experience, see Ruth Busch & Neville 
Robertson, Innovative Approaches to Child Custody and Domestic Violence in New Zealand, 3 J. 
AGGRESSION, MALTREATMENT & TRAUMA 269 (2000). For a critical view, see ]an Freckclton, 
Custodv and Access Disputation and the Prediction of Children's Safety: A Dangerous Initiative, 2 
PSYCHIATRY, I'SYCHOL. & L. 139 (1995). 
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contact with, the child, and consents to the violent party providing day-
to-day care for, or having contact (other than supervised contact) with, 
the child; any views the child expresses on the matter; any steps taken by 
the violent party to prevent further violence occurring; all other matters 
the court considers relevant. 155 
The court also has discretion to order supervised contact if the judge 
is unsure about whether the child will be safe in a parent's care. 156 New 
Zealand takes a "safety first" approach to post-separation parenting. 
A presumption against unsupervised contact where there is any 
history of violence certainly has the benefit of erring on the side of 
safety, but by catching all cases in which any violence or abuse is alleged 
to have occurred any time in the past, it casts the net very wide. Indeed 
there may be an inquiry about safety in relation to both parents in cases 
of mutual aggression. However, a proven act of violence is only a 
catalyst for further inquiry, not a disqualifying factor in itself. It leads to 
a focus on safety, requiring the court to examine specifically the question 
of whether the child will be safe in that parent's care, with a starting 
point being that unsupervised contact will not be permitted. 
There arc nonetheless significant resource implications in adopting 
this approach, and legislation without adequate resourcing will not be 
effective. One issue is the resourcing needed to make a proper risk 
assessment. An evaluation of these provisions a few years after their 
introduction found that frequently the courts had very little information 
on which to make a proper risk assessment, and in most cases did not 
make orders restricting contact. 157 The court made orders for supervised 
access in only 18% of the cases where violence or abuse was an issue 
and there were orders for no access in another 12% of cases. JsR 
A presumption against unsupervised contact, where there is any 
history of violence, also requires either that the government invests in an 
adequate network of supervised contact centers, or that public policy 
countenances a significant number of parents being denied any face to 
face contact with their children. New Zealand has apparently struggled 
with having enough supervised contact places across the country to meet 
the need. 159 
155. Care of Children Act 2004, s. 61 (NZ). 
156. Care of Children Act 2004, s. 61 A (NZ). 
157. PARKINSON,supranote !,at 139. 
!58. ALISON CHETWIN ET AL., TilE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE LEGISLATION AND CHILD ACCFSS IN 
NEW ZEALAND 15 17 ( 1999). 
159. Judge Rosemary Riddell, Protecting Children/rom Family Violence, Paper presented at 
the International Conference on Child Labour and Child Exploitation, at Cairns, Australia, (Aug. 3 
5, 2008), available at http:/ /www.j ustice.govt.ndcourts/ family-court/publications/speeches-and-
papcrs/protecting-children-trom-family-violence. She wrote: "New Zealand had 31 centres, leaving 
many areas unserved. The lack of adequate resources can pose a challenge to Judges who arc 
mandated to keep the welfare and best interests of the child as the paramount consideration in any 
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How often are supervised contact orders made in New Zealand, and 
against whom? Of 4068 final contact orders made in favour of parents in 
2007, 252 supervised contact orders were made in relation to fathers and 
94 in relation to mothcrs. 160 This represents 8.8% of all contact orders 
made in favour of fathers and 7.8% of all contact orders made in favour 
of mothers. 161 Just over 2% of orders made in relation to fathers were 
indirect contact orders only (that is, the orders did not allow for face to 
face contact) and exactly the same percentage of contact orders in 
relation to mothers were also for indirect contact. 162 It appears therefore 
that even in a jurisdiction with a presumption against unsupervised 
contact where there is any history of violence or abuse, in only a small 
minority of cases is such an order actually made. The New Zealand 
experience also demonstrates the extent to which such orders may be 
made against mothers as well as fathers. 163 Laws which are designed to 
protect women and children from violent men are necessarily gender 
neutral in their application. 
VI. THE IMPORTANCE OF DIFFERENTIATING BETWEEN KINDS OF 
FAMILY VIOLENCE 
Clare Dalton has observed how professionals with different 
theoretical orientations tend to "sec" violence and abuse in different 
ways: 
At the level of research and theory, there arc at least three separate 
bodies of learning that describe problematic intimate relationships .... 
One set of literature deals with conflict, another with violence, and a 
third with abuse. A prime source of tension between specialists in 
partner abuse and the majority of mental health professionals who work 
within the family court system is that where the former sec abuse, the 
latter tend to see conflict. A second difference that contributes to this 
tension is that before taking a relationship out of the conflictual 
category and putting it into the abusive category, the mental health 
professional looks for significant evidence of a one-sided pattern of 
physical violence. Those who specialize in abuse, on the other hand, 
understand abusive relationships as being first and foremost about 
power and control. They know that physical violence, while usually a 
proceedings. Enabling a child to maintain a safe relationship with his or her father can be stymied 
where sufficient formally supervised options do not exist." !d. 
160. ROY WYATT, MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, FAMILY COURT STATISTICS IN NEW ZEALAND IN 
2006 AND 2007 32 (2009). 
161. PARKINSON, supra note I, at 139. 
162. !d. at 140. 
163. Indeed, the legislation may have an adverse impact on victims of violence. See, e.g., De 
Leeuw v Edgr>cumhe, [ 1996] NZFLR 80 I (DC), 1996 NZFLR Lcxis 122. 
174 BYU JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW [Volume 26 
potent residual source of power within the relationship, may play only a 
small part in the overall dynamic of control. A third related difference 
is that abuse specialists will always suspect that violence in a 
relationship indicates the presence of a power and control dynamic, 
whereas the mental health professional is quicker to associate violence 
with conflict between relatively evenly matched partners. 164 
These conflicting paradigms lie at the heart of the problem in 
responding to violence and abuse in the context of parenting after 
separation. Whenever professionals in the family law system view 
violence through a theoretical lens of"one-size-fits-all," the dynamics of 
inter-parental relationships within a particular family arc prone to being 
misunderstood. This can have deleterious outcomes for those affected by 
the decisions reached. A similar problem of taking a "one-size-fits-all" 
approach applies to drafting legislation. 
Peter Jaffe and his colleagues have suggested that as a means of 
differentiating between types of violence for the purposes of making 
decisions in parenting disputes, it is important to consider three factors: 
the potency, pattern, and primary perpetrator of the violence. 165 They 
refer to this as PPP screening and describe these three factors as follows: 
First, level of potency-the degree of severity, dangerousness, and 
potential risk of serious injury and lethality-is the foremost dimension 
that needs to be assessed and monitored so that protective orders can be 
issued and other immediate safety measures taken and maintained. 
Prior incidents of severe abuse and injuries inflicted on victims are an 
important indicator of the capacity of an individual to explode or 
escalate to dangerous levels. In some cases, explosive or deadly 
violence can erupt with little or no history of abuse, but other warning 
signs are often evident. ... 
Second, the extent to which the violence is part of a pattern of coercive 
control and domination (rather than a relatively isolated incident) is a 
crucial indicator of the extent of stress and trauma suffered by the child 
and family and the potential for future violence. . . . Third, whether 
there is a primary perpetrator of the violence (rather than it being 
mutually instigated or initiated by one or the other party on different 
occasions) will indicate whose access needs to be restricted and which 
parent, if either, is more likely to provide a nonviolent home, other 
h. b . I 166 t mgs emg equa . 
Certain of these factors can be found in the legislation of various 
164. Clare Dalton, When Paradixms Collide: Protecting Battered Parents and Their Children 
in the Family Court System, 37 FAM. & CONCILIATION CTS. REV. 273, 275 (1999); see also Janet 
Johnson's response to this article, supra note 114. 
165. Peter G. Jaffe et a!., Custody Disputes involving Allegations of' Domestic Violence: 
Toward a Differentiated Approach to Parenting Plans, 46 FAM. CT. R~v. 504 (200X). 
166. Jd. (citations omitted). 
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jurisdictions. For example, in Massachusetts, where a pattern of abuse or 
serious incident of abuse has occurred, there is a rebuttable presumption 
that it is not in the best interests of the child to be placed in sole custody, 
shared legal custody or shared physical custody with the abusive 
parcnt. 167 A "serious incident of abuse" is defined as "the occurrence, 
between a parent and the other parent or between a parent and child, of 
(a) attempting to cause or causing serious bodily injury; (b) placing 
another in reasonable fear of imminent serious bodily injury; or (c) 
causing another to engage involuntarily in sexual relations by force, 
threat or duress." 16x The requirement to identify a pattern of violence 
rather than sporadic incidents goes some way to addressing the problem 
of how to deal with violent incidents that occur only in the context of 
separation without a previous or subsequent history of violence. 
However in order to properly differentiate between types of family 
violence it is also important to focus on the context and severity of the 
violence, as well as the existence of a pattern. There may be a pattern of 
violence by both men and women where the violence erupts out of 
conflict. 
A. Determining the Primary Aggressor 
Wisconsin has addressed the issue of mutual violence by requiring 
the court to try to identify the primary aggressor. There is a rebuttable 
presumption that it is detrimental to the child and contrary to the best 
interest of the child to award joint or sole legal custody to a party if the 
court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the party has engaged 
in a pattern or serious incident of interspousal battery or domestic 
abusc. 169 Where the court finds that both parties engaged in a pattern or 
serious incident of interspousal battery or domestic abuse, the 
presumption against joint or sole legal custody applies only to the party 
who was the "primary physical aggressor." 170 If one, but not both, of the 
parties has been convicted of a crime of domestic abuse, he or she must 
be determined to be the primary aggressor. 171 Otherwise, the court is 
required to consider: 
(a) Prior acts of domestic violence between the parties. 
(b) The relative severity of the injuries, if any, inflicted upon a party 
by the other party in any of the prior acts of domestic violence .... 
167. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 20S, § 31/\ (1998). 
16X. !d. 
169. WIS. STAT§ 767.41(2)(d)1 (2011). 
170. !d. 
171. !d. 
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(c) The likelihood of future injury to either of the parties resulting 
from acts of domestic violence. 
(d) Whether either of the parties acted in self-defense in any of the 
prior acts of domestic violence .... 
(e) Whether there is or has been a pattern of coercive and abusive 
behavior between the parties. 
(f) Any other factor that the court considers relevant .... 172 
It is nonetheless open to the court to find that both parties engaged in 
a pattern or serious incident of violence or abuse and that neither party 
was the primary physical aggressor. 173 
The Wisconsin legislation does seem to represent a sensible 
legislative model that requires courts to examine the three factors of 
potency, pattern, and whether or not there is a primary aggressor. 
VII. CURRENT SAFETY CONCERNS 
Another approach to the issue of mutual violence is to focus attention 
on current safety concerns. This is the focus, for example, in Oregon. In 
Oregon, the court is required to give "primary consideration to the best 
interests and welfare of the child." 174 One of the factors to consider is 
"the abuse of one parent by the other." 175 Furthermore, while Oregon has 
a version of the friendly parent rule 176 -namely that the court must 
consider the willingness and ability of each parent to facilitate and 
encourage a close and continuing relationship between the other parent 
and the child-this does not apply where the other parent has engaged in 
a pattern of abuse against the parent or a child and that a continuing 
relationship with the other parent will endanger the health or safety of 
either parent or the child. 177 The legislation defines abuse as: 
(a) Attempting to cause or intentionally, knowingly or recklessly 
causing bodily injury. 
(b) Intentionally, knowingly or recklessly placing another in fear of 
imminent bodily injury. 
(c) Causing another to engage in involuntary sexual relations by force 
or threat of force. 178 
172. /d.§ 767.41(2)(d)2. 
173. !d.§ 767.41(2)(d)4. 
174. OR. REV. STAT.§ 107.137(1) (2009). 
175. !d.§ 107.137(l)(d). 
176. !d.§ 107.137(1)(1). For criticism of this rule sec Margaret Dore, The "Friendly Parent" 
Concept: A Flawed FactorfiJr Child Custody, 6 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 41 (2004). 
177. OR. REV. STAT.§ 107.137(1)(1) (2009). 
178. /d.§l07.705. 
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The law in Oregon further provides that when reviewing a proposed 
parenting plan, the court must ensure the safety of the parties, but not 
deny parenting time to the noncustodial parent unless the court finds that 
parenting time would endanger the health or safety of the child. If the 
court awards parenting time to a noncustodial parent who has committed 
abuse, the court has to make "adequate provision for the safety of the 
h .ld d h h " 179 c 1 an t e ot er parent. 
A focus on current safety concerns rather than a history of violence 
during the course of the relationship per se, is important to allow a 
concentrated focus of resources on the parents and children who are at 
most risk as a result of post-separation parenting arrangements. A much 
smaller number of parents have concerns about either their own safety or 
the safety of their children a year or two after separation than report a 
history of violence or emotional abuse during the course of the 
relationship. The Australian Institute of Family Studies found that 26% 
of mothers and 17% of fathers reported being physically hurt by their 
partners. 1k0 A further 39% of mothers and 36% of fathers reported 
emotional abuse defined in terms of humiliation, belittling insults, 
property damage and threats of harm during the course of the 
relationship. 1k 1 Yet in interviews which were conducted on average 
fifteen months after separation, a much smaller number of parents had 
current safety concerns either for themselves or their children than had 
reported a history of violence or emotional abuse. Four per cent of 
fathers and 12% of mothers were concerned about their personal safety; 
15% of fathers and 18% of mothers expressed concerns about the safety 
of their child-either alone or in addition to concerns about personal 
safcty. 1k2 
The researchers found that a history of family violence did not 
necessarily impede friendly or cooperative relationships between the 
parents. Sixteen per cent of mothers who reported being physically hurt 
by their ex-partner during the course of the relationship reported friendly 
relationships at the time of the interview and a further 23.5% reported 
179. !d. ~ I 07.105. OR. REV. STAT. § I 07.718(6) (2009) states that the order of the court may 
include: (a) That exchange of a child between parents shall occur at a protected location. (b) That 
parenting time be supervised by another person or agency. (c) That the perpetrator of the abuse be 
required to attend and complete, to the satisfaction of the court, a program of intervention for 
perpetrators or any other counseling program designated by the court as a condition of the parenting 
time. (d) That the perpetrator of the abuse not possess or consume alcohol or controlled substances 
during the parenting time and for 24 hours preceding the parenting time. (e) That the perpetrator of 
the abuse pay all or a portion of the cost of supervised parenting time, and any program designated 
by the court as a condition of parenting time. (f) That no overnight parenting time occur. 
180. PARKINSON, supra note I, at 144. 
181. RAE KASPIEW ET AL., AUSTRL. INST. OF FAMILY STUDIES, EVALUATION OF THE 2006 
FAMILY LAW REFORMS 26 (2009). 
I R2. !d. at 2S. 
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having a cooperative relationship. 183 While others reported distant or 
conflictual relationships, only 18.5% reported a continuing fearful 
relationship. 184 Fifty-five per cent of mothers and 50% of fathers who 
reported emotional abuse by their ex-partner during the course of the 
relationship reported friendly or co-operative relationships by the time of 
interview. 185 
By way of contrast, where a parent had current safety concerns either 
for themselves or for their child, it was much more likely that they would 
report difficult relationships with the other parent. Forty-nine per cent of 
fathers and 54% of mothers with concerns about their own or their 
child's safety indicated that their current inter-parental relationship was 
marked by either conflict or fear. 186 
Parents who had concerns about the safety of their children reported 
that the children had a significantly lower level of wellbeing than those 
parents who did not have such concerns, while a history of family 
violence was no longer statistically significant in terms of child 
wellbeing once socio-demographic characteristics and family dynamics 
were controlled for. 187 
VIII. THE RELEVANCE OF INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE TO 
DECISION-MAKING ON PARENTING AFTER SEPARATION 
In order to avoid the problem of overreach in statutes concerned with 
parenting after separation, it is necessary to focus on why it is that a 
history of violence is relevant to decision-making about parenting after 
. v· 1 b . c f 188 separatiOn. 10 cncc may e an Issue tor a range o reasons. 
183. PARKINSON,supranote !,at 144. 
184. !d. 
185. KASPIEW ET AI.., supra note I X I, at 31 32. 
186. !d. at 32 33. 
187. /d.at269. 
188. There is now extensive literature on the relevance of domestic violence to decision-
making on post-separation parenting. See, e.g., Naomi R. Cahn, Civil Images of Battered Women: 
The Impact of Domestic Violence on Child Custody Decisions, 44 VAND. L. REV. 1041 (1991): 
Mildred Daley Pagclow, Effects of Domestic Violence on Children and Their Consequences j(Jr 
Custody and Visitation Agreements, 7 MEDIATION Q. 347 (1990); MARIANNE HESTER & LORRAINE 
RADFORD, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND CHILD CONTACT ARRANGEMENTS IN ENGLAND AND 
DENMARK (1996); Carol Smart & Brcn Neale, Arguments Against Virtue Must Contact he 
En/breed!, 27 FAM. L. 332 (1997); Martha Fineman, Domestic Violence, Custody, and Visitation, 36 
FAM. L. Q. 211 (2002); PETER JAFFE, NANCY LEMON & SAMANTHA POISSON, CHILD CUSTODY 
AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: A CALL FOR SAFETY AND ACCOUNTABILITY (2003); Miranda Kaye, 
Julie Stubbs & Julia Tolmie, Domestic Violence, Separation and Parenting: Negotiating Saj'ety 
Using Legal Processes, 15 CURRENT ISSUES IN CRIM. JUST. 73 (2003); Prentice L. White, You May 
Never See Your Child Again: Adjusting the Ballerer 's Visitation Rights to Protect Children from 
Future Ahuse, 13 AM. U. J. GENDER, Soc. PoL'Y & L. 327 (2005). 
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A. Safety 
First and foremost, there may be ongoing and serious safety concerns 
for a parent, the child or both. The safety of those involved from serious 
harm ought to be the highest priority. In Australia, this priority is 
expressed in terms of the test of "unacceptable risk." 189 The legislation 
provides that judges, in deciding what parenting orders to make, "must, 
to the extent that it is possible to do so consistently with the child's best 
interests being the paramount consideration, ensure that the order: ... 
docs not expose a person to an unacceptable risk of family violence." 190 
Protection of children from harm is also deemed to be the most important 
consideration for courts in determining what is in the best interests ofthe 
child. 191 
While the risk of intimate partner violence may be lessened when the 
parents arc no longer living together, and may indeed be living some 
considerable distance apart, the history of violence is nonetheless 
relevant to the logistics of any changeover arrangements. Where there is 
a risk of violence towards the primary caregiver, measures need to be put 
in place as far as possible to ensure that the parents do not meet, or meet 
only in a public place where the risk of violence is lessened. The growth 
of contact centers to facilitate handovcrs is one way in which this can 
occur. 
B. Violence and Children's Well-being 
A history of violence is also an important issue to explore in terms of 
the children's attitudes towards living with, or going on visits to, a 
violent parent. A child's fear of the violent parent, or concern about his 
unpredictability, arc relevant matters to explore in a custody evaluation 
189. The test of unacceptable risk was first devised by the High Court of Australia in M v M 
( 19X8) 82 A.L.R 577, 583, in dealing with allegations of child sexual abuse. The Court held that "a 
court will not grant custody or access to a parent if that custody or access would expose the child to 
an unacceptable risk of sexual abuse." !d. at 583. The test was included in legislation in 1995 to 
address the issue of family violence more generally. Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s. 140 (Austl.). In M v 
M. the High Court affirmed the decisions of the trial judge to deny access entirely even though he 
was not satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the father was guilty of sexual abuse of the 
child. 82 A.L.R 577, at 583. He could not say that the father had not sexually abused the child, and 
expressed himself in terms of "lingering doubts" about the child's safety if access were to be 
allowed. !d. at 580. The test of "unacceptable risk" therefore did not require affirmative findings 
either that the child had been abused or that, if she had, the father was responsible. !d. at 582. 
190. Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 60CG (Austl.). On problems in the courts' handling of 
cases involving domestic violence in Australia, see Miranda Kaye et al., Domestic Violence and 
Child Contact Arrangements, 17 AUSTL. J. FAM. L. 93 (2003); KATHRYN RENDELL ET AL., AN 
UNACCEPTABLE RISK: A REPORT ON CHILD CONTACT ARRANGEMENTS WilEN THERE IS VIOLENCE 
IN THE FAMILY (2000). 
191. Familv Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 60CC(2) (b) and (2A) (Austl.). 
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or other expert report, as arc the ways in which witnessing the violence 
has affected the children's love for, and trust in, the parent. 192 The 
sensitive discussion of children's fears concerning conflict between their 
parents may bring out continuing fears about safety in visiting or living 
with one parent which would otherwise not be revealed. 
A tendency to violence also raises issues about the risk of child 
abuse. The overlap between violence and physical abuse is such that 
where a pattern of domestic violence has been demonstrated in the 
course of the parental relationship, there must be concerns about the 
possibility that the children will be physically abused as well. 193 A 
parent's tendency to be violent may well represent an unacceptable risk 
to the safety of the child. 
C. Assessing Maternal Care and Attitudes to the Violent Parent 
Understanding a history of coercive controlling violence may also be 
relevant to other kinds of assessment in determining parenting 
arrangements after separation, including the mother's capacity for 
parenting and her attitude towards contact between the child and the 
other parent. For many women who experience this kind of subjugation 
and control, the psychological effects may have a greater lasting impact 
than the physical abuse. 194 These effects include fear and anxiety, loss of 
self-esteem, depression and posttraumatic stress. 195 They may impact 
significantly on a mother's capacity to parent, 196 particularly in the 
context of coping with the stresses of the relationship breakup and the 
litigation about the parenting arrangements. Mothers may be 
192. Honore M. Hughes, P:,ychological and Behavioral Correlates o{ Family Violence in 
Child Witnesses and Victims, 58 AM. J. 0RTHOPSYCIIIATRY 77 (1988); PETER JAFFE, ET AI.., 
CHILDREN OF BATTERED WOMEN (1990); N. Zoe Hilton, Battered Women's Concerns About Their 
Children Witnessing Wi{e Assault, 7 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 77 (1992); Patrick Parkinson, 
Custody, Access and Domestic Violence, 9 AUSTRALIAN J. FAM. L. 41 ( 1995); Patrick Parkinson 
& Cathy Humphreys, Children Who Witness Domestic Violence The Implications jar 
Child Protection, 10 CHILD & FAM. L. Q. 147 (1998); Jeffrey L. Edlcson, Children's 
Witnessing of Adult Domestic Violence, 14 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 839 (1999); CHILDREN 
EXPOSED TO DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: CURRENT ISSUES IN RESI'ARCH, INTERVENTION, PREVENTION 
AND POLICY DEVELOPMENT (Robert Geffner ct al. cds., 2000); David A. Wolfe ct al., The Hjfects of 
Children's Exposure to Domestic Violence: A Meta-Analysis and Critique, 6 CLINICAL CHILD & 
FAM. PSYCH. REV. 171 (2003); Marian Brandon & Ann Lewis, Significant Harm and Children's 
Experiences of Domestic Violence, 1 CHILD & FAM. SOCIAL WORK 33 (2007); Stephanie Holt et al., 
The Impact of Exposure to Domestic Violence on Children and Young People: A Review o{ the 
Literature, 32 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 797 (2008). 
193. MARIANNE HESTER ET AL., MAKINO AN IMPACT: CHILDREN AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: 
A READER, 41-60 (2d cd. 2007). 
194. Kelly & Johnson, supra note 111, at 483- 84. 
195. !d. 
196. See, e.g., Alytia A. Levendosky & Sandra A. Graham-Bennann, Behavioral Observations 
ofParenting in Battered Women, 14 J. FAM. PSYCH. 80 (2000). 
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misdiagnosed as suffering from various psychopathologies, 197 even 
though their deficiencies and problems arc situational and reactive to the 
. 19X 
cxpcncncc of abuse. 
The experience of coercive controlling violence may also explain a 
parent's resistance to regular contact between the children and the father 
even if it can be made safe through contact handovcrs, or her desire to 
relocate a long way from the other parent when there is not a convincing 
rationale for the move other than to get away. 
It would be a mistake nonetheless to see any history of violence 
within intimate partnerships as being in some way a disqualification to 
parent or a reason to prohibit parent-child contact. There are certainly 
cases of serious violence when contact should be denied entirely, not just 
because of continuing physical risk, but because the mother's 
psychological wellbeing requires it. Yet violence is, regrettably, such a 
common feature of intimate partnerships that there has to be a realistic 
differentiation of cases along the spectrum of family violence. This is 
something that is not easily translated into legislation, where the 
tendency has been to treat family violence as homogenous and based 
upon incidents of physical assault. 
D. When Familial Relationships Can No Longer Endure 
What arc the limitations on the efforts that should be made to support 
the enduring family? Recognition of the notion that families endure 
beyond the separation of the parents does not necessarily involve an 
assumption that all families can or should endure. Nor does it mean that 
the goal of interventions in all cases ought to be to try to build a 
cooperative co-parenting relationship. 
Because there is such a reluctance to sever face-to-face contact 
between a parent and a child entirely, the use of contact centers, where 
available, is often an attractive compromise position. Contact centers 
allow for supervised handovers of children in order to avoid the parents 
meeting, and supervised visitation in cases where there is an ongoing 
concern about abuse of a child. However, where there are ongoing issues 
of violence, abuse or serious dysfunctionality requiring professional 
interventions to sustain the parent-child relationship, questions need to be 
asked about the purpose of those intcrventions. 199 In some cases, 
197. For an analysis, see Nancy S. Erikson, Use of the MMPI-2 in Child Custody t:valuations 
Involving Batteri'd Women: What Does Psychological Research Tell Us, 39 FAM. L. Q. 87, 88-89 
(2005). 
198. !d. 
199. For discussion in the American context, see Elizabeth Barker Brandt, Concerns at the 
Margins ofSup<'rvis<'d Access to Children, 9 J. LAW & FAM. STUD. 201 (2007). 
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therapeutic work with parents may be helpful where, by improving the 
level of co-operation and trust between the parents, the primary carer can 
build enough trust and confidence in the other parent that she feels safe 
to move beyond the security of using the contact han dover service. 200 
Where, however, the reason for the use of the center is because of 
ongoing concerns about safety, the notion that the parents can be assisted 
towards a healthy enough co-parental relationship is, for the most part, 
likely to be unrealistic. In contact centers, there can be a conflict between 
an institutional imperative to help the parents to 'self-manage' to the 
extent that they no longer need the services of the center, and the need 
for ongoing protection from violence or abuse. 201 Services which have 
high levels of demand will want to move people off their books in order 
to place others on them. 
While some parents will move on to self-management, with the 
handover center providing an important half-way house in terms of 
building trust, in other cases, the threat of violence, controlling behaviour 
or abuse may be ongoing. 202 Services should provide life-support to a 
parent-child relationship only for a relatively limited period. After that, if 
serious safety issues have not been and cannot be resolved, then the hard 
decisions need to be taken, with the priority being the safety and the 
wellbeing of the primary caregiver. 
IX. DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: THE NEED FOR A BIFURCATED RESPONSE 
So what of the 'nuclear' argument that any encouragement of shared 
parenting puts women and children at greater risk? The argument 
essentially is that the more that legislation supports and encourages the 
involvement of non-resident parents, the more it exposes women to the 
risk of violence and abuse. The problem of domestic violence has thus 
taken center stage in campaigns against changes to the law which 
promote joint custody, shared parenting and greater contact between non-
resident parents and children. Typically, in the criticisms of a pro-contact 
culture which exposes women and children to a risk of violence, there is 
no differentiation between patterns of intimate partner violence, and only 
violence against women is addressed as an issue. 
As a rhetorical device, there is no doubt as to the political influence 
200. Grania Sheehan ct al., Moving On: The Challenge jiJr Children's Contact Services in 
Australia, in PARENTING AFTER PARTNERING: CONTAINING CONFLICT AFTI'R SEPARATION 147 
(Mavis Maclean ed., 2007). 
201. PARKINSON, supra note I, at 146. 
202. Christine Harrison, lmplacahly Hostile or Appropriately Protective~ Women Managing 
Child Contact in the Context of" Domestic Violence, 14 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 3!! I (2008); 
Tracee Parker ct al., Danger Zone: Battered Mothers and Their Families in Supervised Visitation, 14 
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 1313 (2008). 
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of such arguments. No-one wants to promote laws which make women 
and children less safe; however, there arc not two irreconcilable choices: 
greater involvement of non-resident fathers on the one hand and 
protection from domestic violence on the other. As Dalton argues, what 
we need to do is to focus on "outcomes that will protect abused parents 
and their children from further violence and trauma, while continuing to 
foster strong relationships between children and those parents who can 
be counted on to treat their former partners and their children with 
"f f fl" . ,zo:J respect, even 1 sources o con Jet rcmam. -
Diminishing the emphasis on the meaningful involvement of both 
parents will do little to ensure the safety of women and children, since it 
will at the most lead to many non-resident parents having less time with 
their children rather than no time at all. Conversely, strengthening the 
family law system's capacity for better risk assessment and evidence-
gathering in relation to family violence will do nothing at all to diminish 
the law's support for children to maintain meaningful relationships with 
both parents where there arc no significant safety concerns. 
It is difficult to sec any linear relationship between the amount of 
time fathers spend with their children and the risk of violence to the 
mother. That is, a father who sees the children for four nights every two 
weeks is not more likely to engage in violence towards the other parent 
than a father who has the children for only three nights every two weeks. 
Certainly, the more frequent the handovcrs between the parents the more 
opportunity there is for interaction, but increased duration of contact 
docs not necessarily equate with increased frequency of handovers. 
Contact between parents during school term-time can in any event be 
avoided by structuring the arrangements to involve collection after 
school, with a return to school. 
Issues about the mother's safety in the light of serious concerns 
about ongoing violence either have to be addressed by denying contact 
entirely, by organising the handovcr of children through contact centers 
or other third parties, or by allowing a relocation of the mother to a 
distant place. 
The position is different where there are safety concerns for the 
children, since the more time the father spends with the children, the 
more opportunity there is for harm to occur. The linear relationship 
between time and safety is therefore in terms of threats to the wellbeing 
of children, rather than to the primary caregiver. Having said this, where 
there is a history of serious and ongoing violence in an intimate 
partnership, the risk of abuse to the children ought to be presumed. 
What is needed therefore, is a bifurcation in terms of policy. There 
203_ Dalton. supra note 164, at 287. 
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arc families in which contact between the non-resident parent and the 
children presents serious safety issues for mother, children or both and 
given the history of violence, ongoing contact could bring little 
conceivable benefit to the children. There are other families where at 
least for a period of time, contact needs to be supervised. There are many 
other families where the history of violence by one parent towards the 
other ought to have a decisive impact on choice of primary caregiver, 
and where the evidence of violence has implications for the assessment 
of the character of the non-resident parent and his capacity to meet the 
children's emotional and other needs, leading to consequential decisions 
about the amount of contact that is appropriate in the circumstances. 
A bifurcation in terms of policy reflects the natural demographic of 
post-separation families, with some fathers dropping out of children's 
lives within a few months or years after separation, while others continue 
with regular contact for many years. 204 By no means all father-child 
relationships survive parental separation or should survive, and family 
law systems need to come to terms with that. As the poet Arthur Clough 
once wrote: "Thou shalt not kill; but nccd'st not strive/officiously to 
keep alive."205 Sometimes, perhaps, family law systems around the world 
try too hard to keep alive relationships which are not sufficiently healthy 
to survive without intensive care. 
A bifurcation in terms of policy can be achieved without diminishing 
the importance given to the role of non-resident parents in children's 
lives, as long as there is a recognition in a "pro-contact" culture that an 
absolute priority must be given to the safety of women and children from 
a risk of serious harm, and clear messages are given to the community 
that a history of violence and abuse may lead courts to deny contact. 206 
204. Jacob E. Cheadle et al., Patterns of Nonresident Father Contact, 47 DEMOGRAPHY 205 
(2010). 
205. ARTHUR HUGH CLOUGH, The Latest Decalogue, in POEMS OF ARTHUR HUGH CLOUGH 
184 (1903). 
206. Having a bifurcation in terms of policy is different from having a bifurcation in the factors 
that are used to determine what is in the best interests of the child. A risk of violence is not the only 
factor that ought to be taken into account in detennining parenting arrangements. As Prof. Richard 
Chisholm has observed: "Good parenting can be compromised by other things in addition to 
violence and abuse. A parent may be disabled from responding properly to a child's needs by reason 
of adverse mental health, or physical health. A parent may be indifferent to a child, and leave the 
child unattended for long periods; or seriously neglect the child. A parent may lack the necessary 
dedication and skills to respond to the special needs of a severely handicapped child. Parents may 
each be capable and willing parents in many ways, but the conflict between them might be such as to 
distress and damage the children. In these and many other situations, difficult issues may arise in 
determining what arrangements will be best for children, even though the problems might not fall 
within categories such as 'violence' or 'abuse'. !'or these reasons it may not help in the identification 
of the child's best interests if the law appears to assume that there are two basic types of case, 
namely the ordinary case, and the case involving violence or abuse." Richard Chisholm, Family 
Courts Violence Review (Attorney-General's Department, Canberra, 2009) at 128. 
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The values of the family Jaw system must be consistent with the kinds of 
decisions that are made in child protection cases in determining whether 
it is safe to leave a child in the care of his or her parents, and should not 
offer less protection than would be made in a child protection case. 
Making that decision is often an agonizing judgment call- and one that 
without the benefit of prophetic foresight, is not always made correctly in 
either the child protection system or in the context of family law 
disputes. However, the issues arc similar, and therefore a similar balance 
needs to be struck between the recognition of the importance of parent-
child relationships to both parents and children, and the need to ensure as 
far as possible, that children arc protected from harm. 
